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Abstract Shared information can benefit an agent, allowing
others to aid it in its goals. However, such information can
also harm, for example when malicious agents are aware of
these goals, and can then thereby subvert the goal-maker’s
plans. In this paper we describe a decision process frame-
work allowing an agent to decide what information it should
reveal to its neighbours within a communication graph in or-
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der to maximise its utility. We assume that these neighbours
can pass information onto others within the graph. The in-
ferences made by agents receiving the messages can have
a positive or negative impact on the information providing
agent, and our decision process seeks to assess how a mes-
sage should be modified in order to be most beneficial to
the information producer. Our decision process is based on
the provider’s subjective beliefs about others in the system,
and therefore makes extensive use of the notion of trust with
regards to the likelihood that a message will be passed on
by the receiver, and the likelihood that an agent will use the
information against the provider. Our core contributions are
therefore the construction of a model of information prop-
agation; the description of the agent’s decision procedure;
and an analysis of some of its properties.
Keywords Information sharing · Impacts · Trust · Risk
1 Introduction
Appropriate decision making by an agent operating within
a multi-agent system often requires information from other
agents. However, unless the system is fully cooperative, there
are typically both costs and benefits to divulging information
— while the agent may be able to achieve some goals, oth-
ers might be able to use this information to their own advan-
tage. An agent must therefore weigh up the risks and ben-
efits that information divulgence will bring when deciding
how to act. We use "risk" as an abstract notion of concepts
such as damage, cost, negative effects, harms, penalty and
so on; and "benefit" as an abstract notion of concepts such
as utility, gain, rewards and so on. One of the most critical
factors in this calculation is the trust placed in the entity to
which one is providing the information — an untrusted in-
dividual might pass private information onto others, or may
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act upon the information in a manner harmful to the infor-
mation provider.
In this paper we seek to provide a decision mechanism
for assessing the positive and negative effects of information
release to an agent. Using our mechanism, first discussed in
Bisdikian et al (2013) and expanded here, the agent can de-
cide how much information to provide in order to maximise
its own utility. We situate our work within the context of
a multi-agent system. Here, an agent must assess the risk
of divulging information to a set of other agents who may,
in turn, further propagate the information. The problem the
agent faces is to identify the set of information that should
be revealed to its neighbours (who will potentially propagate
the information further) in order to maximise its own utility.
Within a multi-agent system, the ability of an agent to
assess the risk of information sharing is critical when agents
have to reach agreement, for example when coordinating,
negotiating or delegating activities. In many contexts, agents
have conflicting goals, and inter-agent interactions must take
the risk of a hidden agenda into account. Thus, a theory of
risk assessment for determining the right level of disclosure
to apply to shared information is vital in order to avoid un-
desirable impacts on an information producer.
As a concrete example, consider the work described in
Chakraborty et al (2012), where information from accelerom-
eter data attached to a person can be used to make either
white-listed inferences — that the person desires others to
infer, or black-listed inferences — which the person would
rather not reveal. For example, the person may wish a doc-
tor to be able to determine how many calories they burn in a
day, but might not want others to be able to infer their state
(e.g. sitting, running or asleep). The person must thus iden-
tify which parts of the accelerometer data should be shared
in order to enable or prevent their white- or black-listed in-
ferences. While Chakraborty et al (2012) examined how in-
ferences can be made (e.g. that the sharing of the entropy
of FFT coefficients provides a high probability of detecting
activity level and low probability of detecting activity type),
this work does not consider the impacts of sharing such in-
formation when it is passed on to others.
In this paper we focus on the case where such black- and
white-listed inferences can be made by other agents within a
system, and seek to identify what information to provide in
order to obtain the best possible outcome for the information
provider.
To illustrate such a scenario, let us consider a govern-
mental espionage agency which has successfully placed spies
within some hostile country. It must communicate with these
spies through a series of handlers, some of which may turn
out to be double-agents. It must therefore choose what in-
formation to reveal to these handlers in order to maximise
the benefits that spying can bring to it, while minimising the
damage they can do. It is clear that the choices made by the
agency depend on several factors. First, it must consider the
amount of trust it places in the individual spies and handlers.
Second, it must take into account the amount of harm these
can do with any information it provides to them. Finally, it
must consider the benefits that can accrue from providing
its spies with information. The combination of the first and
second factors together provide a measure of the negative ef-
fects of information sharing. Now when considering the sec-
ond factor, an additional detail must be taken into account,
namely that the information recipients (i.e. the spies) may
already have some knowledge which, when combined with
the information provided by the agency, will result in addi-
tional unexpected information being inferred. Therefore, the
final level of harm which the agency may face depends not
on the information it provides, but instead on the undesired
inferences which hostile spies can make.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we describe our model, outlining the process of
decision making that an agent performs in the presence of
white- and black-listed inferences. We concentrate on a spe-
cial case of communication in multi-agent systems, and show
how such a case can be reduced to communication between
an information provider and consumer (Section 3). We de-
scribe the decision procedure in Section 4. We then contrast
our approach with existing work in Section 5, and identify
several avenues of future work. Section 6 concludes the pa-
per.
2 The Impacts of Information Sharing
We consider a situation where an information producer shares
information with one or more information consumers. These
consumers can, in turn, forward the information to others,
who may also forward it on, repeating the cycle. Further-
more, since a consumer may or may not use the informa-
tion provided as expected by the provider, the producer must
assess the risk it will incur if the provided information is
misused. The decision problem faced by the producer is to
therefore identify an appropriate message to send to a con-
sumer which will achieve an appropriate balance between
desired and undesired impacts. We assume that once infor-
mation is shared, the producer is unable to control its spread
or use further.
We begin by describing a model of such a system. As
part of our notation, we use upper-case letters, e.g. X , to
represent random variables (r.v.’s); lower-case letters, e.g. x,
to represent realisation instances of them, and FX(·) and
fX(·) to represent the probability distribution and density of
the r.v. X respectively; and write Pr(·) and Pr(· | ·) to rep-
resent the probability and conditional probability of discrete
random variables respectively.
We consider a set of agents able to interact with their
neighbours through a set of communication links, as em-
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bodied by a communication graph or network. We intro-
duce the concept of a Framework for Communication As-
sessment FCA0 with respect to a producer ag0 — which is
willing to share some information — that considers the set
of agents, the messages that can be exchanged, the commu-
nication links of each agent, and the recipients of the infor-
mation.
These recipients are either desired or undesired: accord-
ing to our assumption above, once a producer shared the in-
formation, it can not longer control the sharing process. In-
tuitively, a desired recipient is an agent with which the pro-
ducer is willing — i.e. the risk–benefit trade-off is in favour
of benefit — to share information. On the other hand, an
undesired recipient is an agent to which the producer is not
willing to provide information — the risk–benefit trade-off
is in favour of risk.
Moreover, we assume that each agent is aware of its
neighbours (i.e., those it can directly communicate with),
and that the producer agent ag0 has probabilistic knowledge
regarding the network topology. We do not consider how
such probabilistic knowledge is obtained in the current pa-
per, noting that in future work we will exploit the Subjective
Logic approach (Jøsang 2001) for modeling such knowledge
and appropriate machine learning techniques to estimate the
parameters of such models.
Definition 1 A Framework for Communication Assessment
with respect to the producer ag0 (FCA0) is a 4-ple:
〈A, C,M,m〉
where:
– A is a set of agents (ag0 ∈ A);
– C ⊆ A × A is the set of communication links among
agents;
– M is the set of all the messages that can be exchanged;
– m ∈M is a goal message that the producer ag0 intends
to share with other agents; and the producer will need to
decide how to share such a message based on the assess-
ment of its impacts.
– A \ {ag0} is the set of consumers.
Example 1 To illustrate our proposal, let refine our exam-
ple, supposing that British Intelligence (BI) has two spies,
James and Alec, in place in France. James is very loyal to
Britain but not smart. Alec is smart, but his trustworthiness
is highly questionable. BI doest not have direct commu-
nication links to James and Alec. Messages from BI will
need to be delivered through Bob and Alice via a commu-
nication network as in Fig. 1. At some point, BI informs
the spies that in three weeks France will be invaded by a
European country: it hopes that James and Alec can recruit
new agents in France thanks to this information. BI does
not want to share the information that the invasion will be
started by Germany, because they are the only ones aware
of these plans, and a leak would result in endangering the
high-value information sources who provided the plans to
the British Intelligence. Therefore, British Intelligence has
to assess the benefit and risk trade-off in order to determine
how to inform its spies that France will be invaded by a Eu-
ropean country. Formally, we can represent the above exam-
ple FCABI = 〈ABI , CBI ,MBI , agBI ,mBI〉, where:
– ABI = {BI, James,Alec,Bob,Alice};
– CBI = {〈BI,Bob〉, 〈BI,Alice〉, 〈Bob,Alec〉, 〈Bob, James〉,
〈Alice,Alec〉} (see Figure 1);
– M = {m1,m2} with:
– m1: France will be invaded by Germany;
– m2: France will be invaded by a European country;
– agBI is the producer;
– mBI = m1 is the message that BI wants to disseminate;
– {James,Alec} are the consumers.
Fig. 1 The communication of the British Intelligence
Given a framework FCA0, ag0 will make use of the pro-
cedure described in this paper to determine how to share in-
formation. This information sharing decision seeks to iden-
tify a policy of disclosures for the ag0 with respect to the
original messages — the goal of the policy is to reduce the
information conveyed in the delivered messages to other agents
so as to optimize certain criteria, such as maximizing bene-
fits, minimizing risks or optimizing certain trade-offs.
In Example 1, if the agency knows m1, that France will
be invaded by Germany, it may nevertheless share m2 —
France will be invaded by a European country — based on
its policy of disclosure in order to reduce the possible harm
it may accrue from sharing this message.
Definition 2 Given a set of agents A, a message m ∈ M,
two agents ag i, agj ∈ A, we define a disclosure policy from
ag i to agj as follows:
pii,j :M×M 7→ [0, 1].
This disclosure policy prescribes that the original message
m will be transformed into a new message m′ with prob-
ability pii,j(m,m′) = Pri,j(m′ | m). pii,j is a conditional
probability matrix indexed byM×M (the set of all possible
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pairs of messages):
pii,j =

Pr(m1 | m1) Pr(m1 | m2) · · · Pr(m1 | mM )
Pr(m2 | m1) Pr(m2 | m2) · · · Pr(m2 | mM )
...
...
. . .
...
Pr(mM | m1) Pr(mM | m2) · · · Pr(mM | mM )

where M = |M| is the size of the message space. The kth
(k = 1...M ) column pii,j , denoted by pii,j(k), specifies a
distribution over messages to be forwarded when ag i re-
ceives the kth messagemk1. Therefore, we require that each
column vector pii,j(k) satisfies:∑
ml∈M
Pr(ml | mk) = 1.
To clarify the concept of disclosure policy, we elaborate
two special forms for disclosure policy. A policy is called
a deterministic policy if there is a single 1 entry in each
column of the pi matrix. A direct forward policy, written
pi
F is the identity matrix. piF specifies that the probabil-
ity of directly forwarding the original message is 1, namely
Pr(m | m) = 1, and that the probability of modifying the
original message is 0, as Pr(m′ | m) = 0 for any m 6= m′.
Another special deterministic disclosure policy, denoted by
pi
k, is the one by which the agent always sends the same
messagemk out no matter what message it receives. All en-
tries in the kth row of such a matrix are set at 1, with the
remainder of the matrix elements being 0.
Example 2 Continuing with Example 1, assume that the dis-
closure policies piBob, James, piBob, Alec, and piAlice, Alec in the
communication networks have been estimated as follows.
Bob always directly forwards the message to James with
no modification, and therefore has a direct forward policy:
piBob,James =
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
On the other hand, Bob might reduce the information in
the messages probabilistically when forwarding messages to
Alec:
piBob,Alec =
(
0.2 0
0.8 1
)
which specifies that when receiving messagem1, with prob-
ability 0.2 the message m1 will be forwarded but with a
higher probability 0.8 the message m2 of reduced informa-
tion will be forwarded. When message m2 is received, m2
will be forwarded with probability 1.
Finally, Alice also reduces the information in the mes-
sages probabilistically when sending messages to Alec:
piAlice,Alec =
(
0.9 0
0.1 1
)
1 We can treat the possibility that an agent does not forward a mes-
sage by assuming a special “empty message” withinM.
which specifies that when receiving messagem1, with prob-
ability 0.9 the message m1 will be forwarded while with
probability 0.1 message m2 is forwarded. When message
m2 is received,m2 will be forwarded with probability 1.
With these preliminaries in place, we now consider the
concepts of degree of disclosure and impacts of information
sharing.
2.1 Degree of disclosure
Definition 3 For two agents ag i, agj ∈ A and a message
m ∈ M, xi,j ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of disclosure by which
agent ag i will send the message m to agent agj , where
xi,j = 0 implies no sharing and xi,j = 1 implies full dis-
closure between the two agents. We define the disclosure
function as follows:
d :M× [0, 1] 7→ M
d(·, ·) accepts a message and a degree of disclosure (for
that message) as its inputs, and returns a modified message
(referred to as the disclosed portion of the original message).
Following the scenario in Example 1, m1: France will
be invaded by Germany, andm2: France will be invaded by
a European country. BI decides to disclose messages to Bob
with disclosure degree xBI,Bob = 0.6 and BI’s the disclo-
sure function will output d(m1, 0.6) = m2. Here m2 is a
derived message fromm1 whose degree of disclosure is 0.6
relative tom1 — only the portionm2 ofm1 is disclosed.
In this paper, we consider a special form of disclosure
function d which maps a degree of disclosure xi,j (from ag i
to agj) to a deterministic disclosure policy pii,j as follows:
– pii,j(m
′ | m) = 1 iff d(m,xi,j) = m′, and
– pii,j(m
′ | m) = 0 otherwise.
Instead of being deterministic, the degree of disclosure xi,j
is usually described by a random variable Xi,j with proba-
bility density fXi,j , then
pii,j(m
′ | m) =
∫ 1
0
δ (d(m,xi,j)−m
′) fXi,j (xi,j)dxi,j
(1)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function (i.e. a distribution is
at an infinitely high, infinitely thin spike at the origin while
being 0 everywhere). Equation 1 maps a random variable of
the degree of disclosure to a probabilistic disclosure policy.
We do not further examine the exact mapping and the mathe-
matical properties between the degree of disclosure and the
derived message in this work, leaving this as an avenue of
future research.
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2.2 Impacts
Given a FCA0, the decision on how to share information
with the recipients must consider the impact that the in-
formation recipients can have on the producer. For exam-
ple, many information providers are selfish, i.e., will only
share information if doing so provides it with some benefit
while having minimal negative impact. However, such ben-
efit and damage may be subjective and uncertain. Therefore,
when sharing information, the producer not only considers
the benefit it obtains, but must also consider potential risks
based on the following:
1. the degrees of disclosure (the disclosure policies) of mes-
sages exchanged between two agents;
2. the ability of each agent to infer knowledge from the
received (disclosed) message;
3. the impacts (i.e. risks and benefits) that the inferred knowl-
edge has on the information producer.
Let us notice here that the messages are not fully dis-
closed in a sense that the disclosure policy transforms a mes-
sage into another with possibly less information; thereafter
only the transformed message is shared. Also the risk and
benefit of sharing information is subjective to each agent.
However, since we focus on a single producer agent, from a
“cautious” perspective we want to investigate the case where
each agent in the (probabilistically) known topology will
fully disclose the message it receives to its neighbours. This
is a worst case scenario, which can thus be ameliorated by
refining the model of other agents, for instance following
(Burnett et al 2011a).
Definition 4 Given a FCA0 〈A, C,M,m〉, let ag i ∈ A \
{ag0}, Z ∈ Z be a r.v. which represents the impact agent
ag0 receives when sharing the messagem with a disclosure
policy pi0,i (with a corresponding disclosure degree random
variable X0,i) for every neighbor ag i of the producer ag0.
Let pi0 = 〈pi0,i1 , ...,pi0,iN 〉 be a list of disclosure policies
where each agent ag il (l = 1...N ) is an immediate neighbor
of the producer ag0; and correspondingly X0 = 〈X0,i1 , ...,
X0,iN 〉 be a vector of random variables of the disclosure de-
grees from the producer to his immediate neighbors. Z is
called the space of impact which can be described either by
– a continuous random variable Z whose distribution is
described by FZ(·;x0) and fZ(·;x0) (where x_0 is an
instance of the disclosure degree random variable vector
X0), or
– a discrete random variable Z whose probability distri-
bution is described by Pr(z | m) where z ∈ Z is an
impact.
The central theme of this paper is centered around Def-
inition 4. More specifically, we focus on 1) how to derive
the distribution of impacts from disclosure policies; 2) how
to evaluate the benefits, risks and trade-offs of the impacts;
and 3) how to determine the disclosure policies accordingly.
Example 3 Continuing with Example 2, BI will need to com-
pute two disclosure policies piBI, Bob and piBI, Alice to deter-
mine how to forward messages to Bob and Alice respec-
tively. As the framework already specifies the message m1
to be the goal message which BI wants to disseminate, we
just need to compute the first columnspiBI, Bob(1) andpiBI, Alice(1)
of the two policy matrices piBI, Bob and piBI, Alice — BI need
to choose between the following among two vectors:
(
1
0
)
or
(
0
1
)
for column piBI, Bob(1) and column piBI, Alice(1) re-
garding Bob and Alice respectively. As we don’t need to
compute the second column2, without loss of generality, we
assume that BI needs to choose between two policy matri-
ces: pim1 =
(
1 1
0 0
)
or pim2 =
(
0 0
1 1
)
. We call such choices
candidate disclosure policies. Now let’s denote the candi-
date disclosure policies of BI by: pim1BI, Bob, pi
m1
BI, Alice, pi
m2
BI, Bob,
and pim2BI, Alice respectively,
3 Communication Networks
We now turn our attention to communication between agents
who must send information via intermediaries. We show that
under some special conditions, such communication can be
abstracted as direct communication in terms of equivalent
disclosure policies. In order to show this result, we introduce
two operators combining disclosure policies when informa-
tion is shared in this way. The first operator discounts the
disclosure policies based on agents within the message path,
while the second operator fuses information which may have
traveled along multiple paths.
3.1 Discount operator
Fig. 2 Combining disclosure policies: single communication path
(Definition 5).
Figure 2 depicts the simplest case where the first opera-
tor can be applied. Let us suppose that there are three agents
2 The second column of BI’s disclosure policy deals with the case
that m2 is the goal message to be shared. Having the second column
in the producer’s disclosure policy as a placeholder helps to unify the
notion of disclosure policy for both producer and the other agents.
6 Yuqing Tang et al.
BI, Bob, and James, and a piece of informationm is shared
by BI with Bob, as per BI’s disclosure policy piBI,Bob — the
message sent to Bob ism′ with probabilitypiBI,Bob(m,m′).
Bob then shares m′ with James, sending James a message
m′′ with probability piBob,James(m′,m′′). To model this
message propagation scenario, we define the following dis-
count operator:
Definition 5 Given a FCA0 〈A, C,M,m〉, let 〈ag i, agk〉 ∈
C and 〈agk, agj〉 ∈ C be a communication path from agent
ag i to agj with corresponding disclosure policies pii,k and
pik,j respectively. We define a discount operator ⊙ which
computes the equivalent disclosure policy from ag i to agj :
pii,j = pii,k ⊙ pik,j .
Due to the mapping between disclosure policies and disclo-
sure degrees (see Equation 1), the discount operator is used
to compute an equivalent degree of disclosure (a random
variable) from ag i to agj which is defined as:
Xi,j = Xi,k ⊙Xk,j
whereXi,k andXk,j are the random variables of the degrees
of disclosure from ag i to agk and from agk to agj respec-
tively.
Note that we make the natural assumption that the oper-
ator ⊙ satisfies the associativity:
(ai,j ⊙ aj,k)⊙ ak,l = ai,j ⊙ (aj,k ⊙ ak,l)
In this paper, we instantiate the discount operator for our
matrix form of disclosure policies through matrix multipli-
cation:
pii,j = pii,k ⊙ pik,j
= pii,k × pik,j . (2)
This instantiation of the Discount operator essentially as-
sumes a form of local Markov property — that how the
agents apply their disclosure policies only depends on the
message they received, and is independent of the messages’
transportation history. Effectively, this discount operator mod-
els a Markov Chain over message passing.
Example 4 Continuing with Example 2, although there is no
direct communication link between BI and James, we can
compute the equivalent disclosure policy from BI to James
as:
piBI,James = piBob,James × piBi,Bob.
Recall that piBob,James =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. Assume that BI chooses
to use a candidate disclosure policy: pim1BI,Bob =
(
1 1
0 0
)
(the other candidate disclosure policy is pim2BI,Bob), then the
equivalent disclosure policy from BI to James can be com-
puted as:
piBI,James = piBob,James × piBI,Bob
=
(
1 0
0 1
)
×
(
1 1
0 0
)
=
(
1 1
0 0
)
Note that this example demonstrates an extreme case of the
disclosure policies where all the policies are deterministic.
3.2 Fusion operator
Fig. 3 Combining disclosure policies: multiple communication paths
(Definition 6).
Our second operator deals with the case where there are
multiple paths that a message can traverse before reaching
an information consumer. This is the case depicted in Fig. 3,
where BI can send a message along several communica-
tion paths in order to increase the likelihood that it reach
its destination (Alec). BI shares information with Bob and
Alice, but discloses these messages following different poli-
cies piBI,Bob and piBI,Alice. Afterwards, both Bob and Al-
ice will disclose the received messages to Alec following
their own disclosure policies piBob,Alec and piAlice,Alec. To
model this, we define a fusion operator (in Definition 6 be-
low) which when used with the discount operator defined in
Definition 5 above, provides us with an equivalent disclo-
sure policy as if the message was sent directly from BI to
Alec (piBI,Alec).
Definition 6 Given a FCA0 〈A, C,M,m〉, let agkl (l =
1, ...N ) be an intermediate agent which has direct links be-
tween ag i and agj (whereN is the number of such interme-
diate agents): i.e. 〈ag i, agkl〉 ∈ C and 〈agkl , agj〉 ∈ C is a
communication path from agent ag i to agj for every inter-
mediate agent agkl . The corresponding policies are denoted
by pii,kl and pikl,j . We define a fusion operator ⊕ which
computes the equivalent disclosure policy from ag i to agj
over all alternative communication paths:
pii,j = ⊕
N
l=1 (pii,kl ⊙ pikl,j) .
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By the mapping between disclosure policies and disclosure
degrees (see Equation 1), the fusion operator to compute an
equivalent degree of disclosure from ag i to agj can be de-
fined as:
Xi,j = ⊕
N
l=1 (Xi,kl ⊙Xkl,j)
where Xi,kl and Xkl,j are the random variables of the de-
grees of disclosure from ag i to agkl and from agkl to agj
respectively.
Again in this paper we only consider the fusion operator for
the matrix forms of disclosure policies:
pii,j = ⊕
N
l=1 (pii,kl ⊙ pikl,j)
=
(
N∑
l=1
(pii,kl × pikl,j)
)
× C (3)
where C is |M|×1 matrix. Each entry cu of C is a re-
normalized constant for the uth column in the equivalent
policy matrix pii,j to guarantee that every column can still
be summed up to 1 to ensure the resulting policy matrix is
a column-wise conditional probability matrix. This fusion
operator is a special case of the mixing or average operator
over Dempster-Shafer probabilities adapted from Sentz and
Ferson (2002).
Example 5 Continuing with Example 2, there are two paths
from BI to Alec: 1) BI — Bob — Alec, and 2) BI — Alice
— Alec. First we discount the disclosure policies along the
path BI — Bob — Alec:
pi
Bob
BI,Alec = piBob,Alec × piBi,Bob.
Second we discount the disclosure policies along the path)
BI — Alice — Alec:
pi
Alice
BI,Alec = piAlice,Alec × piBi,Alice.
Then we fuse the two paths:
piBI,Alec = (x
Bob
BI,Alec + x
Alice
BI,Alec)×
(
1
2
1
2
)
where the constant 12 is used to re-normalize the merged
probabilities. Note that this choice of 12 as the re-normalizing
constant assumes that the two paths have equal influence
over the distributions of the delivered message so that the
two distributions are averaged together. Other operators (for
examples, those from the Dempster-Shafer theory literature
Sentz and Ferson (2002)) can be applied with respect to ad-
ditional background knowledge about the nature of different
paths and how they interact.
Now if BI chooses pim1Bi,Bob (to send the message m1
to Bob) and pim2Bi,Alice (to send m2 to Alice), we can fuse
(estimate) an equivalent disclosure policy from BI to Alec:
pi
m1,m2
BI,Alec
=
(
piBob,Alec × pi
m1
Bi,Bob + piAlice,Alec × pi
m2
Bi,Alice
)
×
(
1
2
1
2
)
=
(
0.1 0.1
0.9 0.9
)
3.3 Equivalent indirect disclosure policy
Having described the discount and fusion operators ⊙ and
⊕, we are ready to compute the equivalent indirect disclo-
sure policy between the producer and any information con-
sumer in the communication network:
Definition 7 Given a FCA0 〈A, C,M,m〉, let N I(ag i) =
{agj | 〈ag i, agj〉 ∈ C} be the set of incoming agents neigh-
bouring ag i. We can define an equivalent indirect disclosure
policy between the producer ag0 and the information con-
sumer agq 6= ag0 as:
pi0,q = ⊕agk∈NI(agq) (pi0,k ⊙ pik,q) (4)
wherepi0,k is recursively computed using the Equation 4 un-
til a direct communication link is reached (at this point, the
predetermined disclosure policy is used in the computation).
Note that the disclosure policies of intermediate agents
might be determined following a complex decision making
process, such as the trade-offs of benefits and risks we will
introduce in Section 4. The disclosure policies of intermedi-
ate agents are usually not known to the producer. However,
we assume that such policies can be estimated using appro-
priate methods by considering knowledge or beliefs regard-
ing the intermediate agents.
In this paper, we do not further detail the operators over
the communication network. More discussions regarding the
appropriateness of these operators over communication net-
works (or trust networks) can be found in Tang et al (2011).
3.4 Distribution of delivered messages
We now characterize the distribution of messages that can
be received by an information consumer. Let mk ∈ M be
the kth message the producer ag0 shares in the first place.
In this case, we can represent the distribution of messages
from the producer with the kth basis unit vector: emk =[
0 . . . 1 . . . 0
]T
which is a column vector where only the
entry corresponding to message mk is set to 1 and all other
8 Yuqing Tang et al.
entries are set to 0. Now let agent agq be the information
consumer. The distribution of messages that agq will receive
can be computed as following:
– First we compute the equivalent disclosure policy from
ag0 to agent agq:
pi0,q = ⊕agk∈NI(agq) (pi0,k ⊙ pik,q) .
– Then we compute the distribution of delivered messages
for agent agq:
x0,q =

Prq(m1)
Prq(m2)
...
Prq(mM )
 = pi0,q × em
As the initial goal message m is specified in a framework
FCA0 〈A, C,M,m〉, the producer’s choices in disclosure
policies (resp. the degrees of disclosure in the continuous
case) will determine the a distribution of delivered messages
to a consumer agq . Therefore, when FCA0 〈A, C,M,m〉
is fixed, the following three notations can derive from each
other:
– the equivalent disclosure policy from the producer ag0
to a consumer agq , denoted by piag0,q ,
– the equivalent random variable of the degree of disclo-
sure from the producer ag0 to a consumer agq , denoted
by Xag
0
,q , and
– the distribution of delivered messages from the producer
ag0 to a consumer agq , denoted by xag0,q .
Therefore in this paper we use the piag
0
,q , xag
0
,q , and xag
0
,q
interchangeably (especially in the continuous version of our
model) when the FCA0 〈A, C,M,m〉 is fixed.
Example 6 Continuing with Example 5, recall that the frame-
work specifies that the goal message that BI intends to share
is m1. Assume that BI selects in its disclosure policies to
send message m1 to Bob while sending m2 to Alice. Given
that the goal message distribution is a unit basis vector
(
1
0
)
(i.e., intent to share message m1), we can now compute
a distribution over all possible messages delivered to Alec
governed by the disclosure policies:
x
m1,m2
BI,Alec
= (piBob,Alec × pi
m1
Bi,Bob + piAlice,Alec × pi
m2
Bi,Alice)
×
(
1
2
1
2
)
×
(
1
0
)
=
(
0.1
0.9
)
Please note that if Alec wants to recover the original mes-
sage that the producer intends to share from this distribu-
tion, he will need to know all the agents’ disclosure policies
(probabilistically) in the network and he can only recover a
distribution of the original messages instead of a determin-
istic one. How much he can recover the original message
can be measured by information theoretical concepts, such
as mutual-information and conditional entropy, based on the
distribution over all pairs of messages — the message it re-
ceives and the original message that the producer intends to
share. This will be in the line of our future study.
4 The Decision Process
Having computed the distribution of messages that the con-
sumer agent will receive when a messagem is shared through
a communication network, we can now turn our attention to
the core of the decision process for assessing impact, which
is an integration of the estimation of the inferred knowledge
and the estimation of impacts of the inferred knowledge that
the message has on the producer ag0.
Definition 8 Given a FCA0 〈A, C,M, ag0,m0〉, for a dis-
tribution of messages (represented as a random variable xq
over the messages M) that the consumer agq can receive,
we describe a distribution y of the amount of knowledge that
agq can infer from x as a random variable yq = I(xq) ∈ Y
which is either
– a continuous random variable whose cumulative distri-
bution and density function are FIq (·;xq) and fIq (·;xq)
respectively; or
– a discrete random variable whose distribution is Pr(yq |
mi).
Y is called the space of inference.
Working with discrete random variables, the inference of
agent agq corresponds to the following inference matrix:
Iq =

Pr(y1 | m1) Pr(y1 | m2) · · · Pr(y1 | mM )
Pr(y2 | m1) Pr(y2 | m2) · · · Pr(y2 | mM )
...
...
. . .
...
Pr(yN | m1) Pr(yN | m2) · · · Pr(yN | mM )

Each entry Pr(yi | mj) represents the probability that agent
agq makes inference yi ∈ Y when receiving messagemi ∈
M. The ith column of Iq corresponds to the inference distri-
bution that can be made from receiving a messagemi ∈M.
Note that every column will sum up to 1 as we require that
ΣNj=1Pr(bj | mi) = 1 for a valid conditional probabil-
ity. The size of matrix Iq is N ×M where N = |Y| and
M = |M|. As Iq is a valid conditional probability table,
there are (N − 1) ×M number of independent parameters
in Iq .
Example 7 Continuing with Example 1, let the inference
spaceY = {y0, y1} where
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– y0: “France will be invaded by a European country” (equiv-
alent tom2), and
– y1: “France will be invaded by Germany” (equivalent to
m1).
BI believes that an information consumer will make such
an inference with probability u(m1)q and 1 − u(m1)q re-
spectively if receiving message m1, and with probability
u(m2)q and 1 − u(m2)q respectively if receiving message
m2. Clearly, we have to distinguish between James and Alec’s
ability to make inferences:
IJames =
(
uJames(m1) uJames(m2)
1− uJames(m1) 1− uJames(m2)
)
=
(
0 0.8
1 0.2
)
while
IAlec =
(
uAlec(m1) uAlec(m2)
1− uAlec(m1) 1− uAlec(m2)
)
=
(
0 0.4
1 0.6
)
.
When receiving message m1: “France will be invaded by
Germany”, both James and Alec will trivially infer y1: “France
will be invaded by Germany” as they are identical. When re-
ceiving messagem2: “France will be invaded by a European
country”, as James is not clever he will only be able to infer
y1: “France will be invaded by Germany” with a probability
0.2 while with probability 0.8 James will stay with the orig-
inal information of m2. On the other hand, as Alec is smart
he will be able to make additional inferences to reach y1
with a higher probability of 0.6 while given the information
y0 (i.e.m2) with a relatively low probability of 0.4.
4.1 Reasoning about impacts
As we have previously discussed, the provision of informa-
tion enables a recipient to make inferences which have an
impact on the information producer. We capture this impact
as a random variable over an impact space Z (see Defini-
tion 4). In Definition 4, our target is to establish a probabilis-
tic link between the disclosure policy (resp. the degree of
disclosure and the derived probabilistic distribution of mes-
sages) and the impact. However, we have not yet specified
how such a probabilistic link can be established. In this sec-
tion, we establish this link through inference.
Definition 9 Given a FCA0 〈A, C,M, ag0,m〉, let yq be a
random variable regarding the inference that a consumer agq
can make when the producer ag0 disseminates the message
m through the communication network. We define the im-
pact of agq’s inferences on the producer ag0 as a real ran-
dom variable zq = Zq(yq) ∈ Z (as defined in Definition 4)
which is either
– a continuous random variable whose cumulative distri-
bution and density function are FZq (·; yq) and fZq (·; yq)
respectively, or
– a discrete random variable whose distribution is Pr(zq |
yq).
The discrete case can be treated in a similar manner to the
inference matrix, that is, via the use of an an impact matrix
which encodes the conditional probabilities of an impact:
Zq =

Pr(z1 | y1) Pr(z1 | y2) · · · Pr(z1 | yN )
Pr(z2 | y1) Pr(z2 | y2) · · · Pr(z2 | yN )
...
...
. . .
...
Pr(zK | y1) Pr(zK | y2) · · · Pr(zK | yN )

Each entry Pr(zk | yj) represents the probability that agent
agq can cause impact zk ∈ Z to the producer ag0 when
agq can make inference yj ∈ Y. The jth column of Zq
corresponds to the impact distribution that can occur if the
jth inference yj is made by the consumer agent. Again, ev-
ery column will sum up to 1 as ΣKk=1Pr(zk | yj) = 1.
|Zq|= K × N where N = |Y| and K = |Z|. Zq has
N × (K − 1) independent parameters. With an impact ma-
trix Zq , we layout the corresponding impact evaluation into
a vector zq , defined as follows:
zq =

z1
z2
...
zK

where K = |Z|. Entry zk in zq is the k-th impact that agent
agq can make to the producer. zq is called the impact vector
(an impact distribution) on the producer ag0 by agent agq .
We concentrate on two types of impact, namely the ben-
efits and risks of the inferences made by the consumer on
the producer. We respectively refer to these as the benefits
and risks to the producer.
– Benefit B: Let bq ∈ B be the producer ag0’s evaluation
of the benefit of inferences a consumer agq can make
following the receipt of a message. Following Defini-
tion 9, we model benefit via either a continuous random
variableBq(yq)with cumulative distribution and density
function FBq (·; yq) and fBq (·; yq) respectively; or a dis-
crete random variable whose distribution is Pr(bq | yq).
– Risk R: Let rq ∈ R be the producer ag0’s evaluation
of the risk of the harm of inferences a consumer agq can
make following the receipt of a message. Following Def-
inition 9, we model risk via either a continuous random
variableRq(yq)with cumulative distribution and density
function FRq (·; yq) and fRq (·; yq) respectively; or a dis-
crete random variable whose distribution is Pr(rq | yq).
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Fig. 4 The probabilities of inference and trust following sharing.
For notational clarity, we explicitly list benefit vector bq and
risk vector rq respectively as follows.
bq =

b1
b2
...
bKB

where KB = |B|. Entry bk in bq is the k-th benefit the
producer can obtain regarding agent agq .
rq =

r1
r2
...
rKR

where KR = |R|. Entry rk is the k-th risk the producer is
concerned with regarding agent agq .
Figure 4 provides a graphical interpretation of inference
(Definition 8) and impact (Definition 9), distinguishing be-
tween risk and benefit, when a producer ag0 communicates
a message m according to his disclosure policies pi0,j to a
neighbor agj of his. Given the derived disclosure policypi0,q
towards the final consumer in the communication network,
the consumer might infer information yq drawn from all pos-
sible inferences. This results in an impact zq drawn from the
space of possible impacts, which is conditioned on the infer-
ence yq made by the consumer. This impact zq can be either
a risk (rq) or a benefit (bq).
Example 8 Continuing with Example 7, for each of the pos-
sible inferences there are two impacts: the risk and the ben-
efit. We consider two levels of risk, represented in a vector
as r =
(
r1
r2
)
. We associate a utility cost with these two
outcomes: r1 = 20K (20000) and r2 = 100K (100000)
respectively, as depicted in the Figure 4. In other words,
that the risk r1 is 20K represents the situation that James
or Alec gets captured when they are trying to recruit new
agents. On the other hand, that the impact r2 is 100K repre-
sents that James or Alec leaks that the country being invaded
is Germany leading to the loss of a high value information
sources in Germany for the UK government. Let us char-
acterize the risk impact probability based on the inference
obtained with the following parameters: w(y0)q = Prq(r1 |
y0) and w(y1)q = Prq(r1 | y1). Applying the matrix for-
malism, the risk impact distribution matrices of James and
Alec are as follows.
ZRJames =
(
w(y0)James w(y1)James
1− w(y0)James 1− w(y1)James
)
=
(
0.9 0.8
0.1 0.2
)
.
ZRJames means that when the risk materializes, if y0: “France
will be invaded by a European country” is inferred, with a
high probability 0.9 it will result in a low cost 20K outcome;
while with a low probability 0.1 it will result in the high cost
100K outcome. This is the case because the information in
the inference y0 rarely causes the high cost. On the other
hand, if y1: “France will be invaded by Germany”is inferred,
because James is loyal, he won’t provide the enemy with full
information even he is captured. Therefore, in this case with
a probability of 0.8, the impact will have a cost of 20K,
while the likelihood of a 100K cost outcome is 0.2.
Similarly for Alec, we have
ZRAlec =
(
w(y0)Alec w(y1)Alec
1− w(y0)Alec 1− w(y1)Alec
)
=
(
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
)
ZRAlec describes the case where when y0 — “France will be
invaded by a European country” is inferred, it will result in
the 20K outcome with a likelihood of 0.9, and in a 100K
cost outcome with a likelihood of 0.1. On the other hand, if
y1 (“France will be invaded by Germany”) is inferred, Alec’s
loyalty results in a 100K cost with a likelihood of 0.9, and
the low 20K cost with a likelihood of only 0.1.
Benefit is treated in a similar manner. We consider two
levels, represented in a vector as b =
(
b1
b2
)
. We associate
two benefit levels, b1 = 10K, and b2 = 120K, as depicted
in the Figure 4. In our running example the benefit impact
b1 of 10K could represent the situation that either James or
Alec recruit some spies but these spies are not as valuable
as expected. On the other hand, that the benefit impact b2
of 120K represents the case where James or Alec recruits a
number of spies that are highly valuable. Returning to our
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matrix representation, the benefit impact distribution matri-
ces of James and Alec are as follows.
ZBJames =
(
0.6 0.5
0.4 0.5
)
.
ZBJames means that when the benefit materializes, if y0: “France
will be invaded by a European country” is inferred, then we
will obtain a benefit of 10K with a likelihood of 0.6, while
the benefit of 120K will occur with a likelihood of 0.4. Al-
ternatively, if James infers y1, the likelihood of obtaining
benefit 10K or 120K both become 0.5.
Similarly for Alec, we have
ZBAlec =
(
0.5 0.2
0.5 0.8
)
Meaning that inference y0 results in a equal chance of
the two benefits materialising, while inference y1 makes the
120K outcome more likely (0.8) than the 10K outcome
(0.2).
In Bisdikian et al (2013) we show that several interesting
properties hold in the case of continuous r.v.’s. These proper-
ties can be found in Appendix A. However, in this paper we
concentrate on discrete random variables and the properties
obtained in such a model.
The random variable Bq implicitly captures an aspect of
the producer’s trust in the consumer, as it reflects the for-
mer’s belief that the consumer will utilise the information
in the manner it desires. Similarly, the random variable Rq
captures the notion of distrust in the consumer, describing
the belief that the consumer will utilise the information in a
harmful manner. Note that when considering repeated inter-
actions, these random variables will evolve as the producer
gathers experience with various consumers. The evolution
of these random variables can be captured as an incremen-
tal process of estimating the parameters of the probabilis-
tic models behind these random variables. The probabilis-
tic estimation of the disclosure policy matrix, the inference
matrix, the benefit and risk impact matrices can be viewed
as special case of such kinds of random variable evolution.
In the current work we assume that a steady state has been
reached with regards to the parameter estimates, allowing us
to ignore the problem of updating the distribution.
Corollary 1 Assume that the impact z is independent of the
messagem given the inferred information y. Given a FCA0
〈A, C,M, ag0,m〉, x0,q (the delivered message distribution),
Iq (the inference matrix) andZq (the impact matrix) of agent
agq , the distribution of the impact z˜q that agent agq can
have on the producer ag0 can be computed as follows.
z˜0,q = Zq × Iq × x0,q
where
z˜0,q =

Pr(z1)
Pr(z2)
...
Pr(zK)

Here, entry Pr(zk) is the probability with which agent agq
causes the kth impact to ag0. Pr(zk) is the marginal prob-
ability over all possible messages and inferences. z˜0,q is
called the the impact distribution vector of a consumer agq
incurred by the producer ag0.
Example 9 Continuing with our running example, we can
now combine the estimation of delivered message distribu-
tion, the inference distribution and impact distribution to-
gether to establish a distribution over all possible impacts.
Assume that BI releases message m1 to Bob and message
m2 to Alice, then the distributions of delivered messages to
James and Alec are:
x
m1,m2
0,James =
(
1
0
)
x
m1,m2
0,Alec =
(
0.1
0.9
)
We can compute the risk impact distributions for James and
Alec as:
z˜
R
James = Z
R
James × IJames × x
m1,m2
0,James
=
(
0.9 0.8
0.1 0.2
)
×
(
0 0.8
1 0.2
)
×
(
1
0
)
=
(
0.8
0.2
)
z˜
R
Alec = Z
R
Alec × IAlec × x
m1,m2
0,Alec
=
(
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
)
×
(
0 0.4
1 0.6
)
×
(
0.1
0.9
)
=
(
0.39
0.61
)
We can compute the benefit impact distributions for James
and Alec as:
z˜
B
James = Z
B
James × IJames × x
m1,m2
0,James
=
(
0.6 0.5
0.4 0.5
)
×
(
0 0.8
1 0.2
)
×
(
1
0
)
=
(
0.5
0.5
)
z˜
B
Alec = Z
B
Alec × IAlec × x
m1,m2
0,Alec
=
(
0.5 0.2
0.5 0.8
)
×
(
0 0.4
1 0.6
)
×
(
0.1
0.9
)
=
(
0.31
0.69
)
Definition 10 Given aFCA0 〈A, C,M, ag0,m〉, z˜q (the im-
pact probability distribution vector) and zq (the impact vec-
tor) regarding agent agq . The expected impact regarding agent
agq is
E{Zq} = z
T
q × z˜q.
Since the impact can be either a benefit or a risk, Zq
can be specialised in ZBq (benefits probability matrix) or Z
R
q
(risk probability matrix). Correspondingly, the distribution
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of impact can be either a benefit distribution or a risk distri-
bution, b˜q (benefits distribution vector) or r˜q (risk distribu-
tion vector); the impact vector can be either a benefit vector
bq or a risk vector rq; the expected impact E{zq} can either
be the expected benefit E{Bq} or the expected risk E{Rq}.
Corollary 2 Assume that the impact z is independent of the
messagem given the inferred information y. For agent agq ,
given a delivered message distribution x0,q; the inference
matrix Iq; the benefit impact matrix Z
B
q ; the risk impact ma-
trix ZRq ; the benefit vector bq; and the risk vector rq . The
expected benefit E{Bq} and the expected risk E{Rq} that
agent agq has towards ag0 is be computed as follows.
E{Bq} = b
T
q × Z
B
q × Iq × x0,q (5)
E{Rq} = r
T
q × Z
R
q × Iq × x0,q (6)
If we assume that benefit and risk are comparable (as
done in decision theory when expressed as utilities), we can
now define the net benefit of sharing information as follows.
Definition 11 Given aFCA0 〈A, C,M, ag0,m〉, the net ben-
efit for the producer to share information through the com-
munication network C with agq ∈ A \ {ag0} is described
by Cq = Bq − Rq . The expected net benefit is defined as
E{Cq} = E{Bq −Rq}.
Corollary 3 Given aFCA0 〈A, C,M, ag0,m〉. Assume that
the impact z is independent of the message m given the in-
ferred information y. For an agent agq , given the delivered
message distribution x0,q; the inference matrix Iq; the bene-
fit impact matrix ZBq ; the risk impact matrix Z
R
q ; the benefit
vector bq; and the risk vector rq . The expected net benefit
E{Cq} that agent agq can provide to the producer ag0 can
be computed as follows:
E{Cq} =
(
b
T
q × Z
B
q − r
T
q × Z
R
q
)
× Iq × x0,q
(7)
Assume that there is a bijection between the spaces of benefit
impact and risk impact, namely Bq(yq) = f(Rq(yq)) where
f is a bijection. Further assume that Bq(yq) and f(Rq(yq))
have the same distribution after the mapping f represented
by the matrix Zq . Then the expected net benefit can be sim-
plified to be as follows.
E{Cq} =
(
b
T
q − r
T
q
)
× Zq × Iq × x0,q.
Definition 12 Given a FCA0 〈A, C,M, ag0,m〉, the global
net benefit is
C =
∑
agj∈A\{ag0}
Cj .
By the linearity of expectation, the expected global net ben-
efit E{C} is
E{C} =
∑
agj∈A\{ag0}
E{Cj}.
Example 10 Continuing with Example 9, we again assume
that BI delivers messagem1 to Bob andm2 to Alice, we can
then compute the expected risk, expected benefit, and the
expected net benefit obtained by James and Alec receiving
the messages as follows.
E{RJames} = r
T × ZRJames × IJames × x0,James
= 36K
E{RAlec} = r
T × ZRAlec × IAlec × x0,Alec
= 68.96K
E{BJames} = b
T × ZRJames × IJames × x0,James
= 65K
E{BAlec} = b
T × ZRAlec × IAlec × x0,Alec
= 86.12K
E{CJames} = (b
T × ZRJames − r
T × ZRJames)
× IJames × x0,James
= 29K
E{CAlec} = (b
T × ZRAlec − r
T × ZRAlec)
× IAlec × x0,Alec
= 17.16K
To simplify the scenario, we ignore the benefit and risk of
disclosing messages to Bob and Alice. The expected global
net benefit is then as follows.
E{C} = 29K + 17.16K = 46.16K.
4.2 Decision making
Given a FCA 〈A, C,M,m〉, we now have an integrated
model which relates message sharing, disclosure policies,
communication network, inference estimation, impact esti-
mation to compute the expected global net benefits. The de-
cision making problem can now be posed as requiring the
computation, for the producer ag0, a list of disclosure poli-
cies, one for each of its neighbors such that they can lead to
the maximum global net benefit.
To formalize the decision making problem, let us start
with the disclosure policies. Let
NO(ag0) = {agk | 〈ag0, agk〉 ∈ C}.
be the set of outgoing neighbors of the producer ag0. Let
Π0,k = {pi0,k}
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be the set of all possible disclosure policies that the producer
can use to deliver message to its neighbor agk ∈ N
O(ag0).
The space of all possible policies of the producer is then
defined as
Π0 =
∏
agk∈N
o(ag
0
)
Π0,k.
Therefore a choice pi0 ∈ Π0 of the producer’s disclosure
policies to its neighbors can be captured by the vector
pi0 = 〈pi0,j1 ,pi0,j2 , ...,pi0,jN 〉
where agji ∈ N
O(ag0) is a neighbor of producer in the
communication network. As discussed in Section 3, every
choice of a disclosure policy vector pik0 ∈ Π0 will result
in an equivalent indirect disclosure policy for each agent
agq ∈ A \ {ag0}, we denote such an equivalent indirect
policy corresponding to the policy vector pik0 as pi
k
0,q .
Finally, given a FCA 〈A, C,M,m〉, we can formalize
the decision problem as an optimization problem on the ex-
pected global net benefit:
pi
∗
0 = argmax
pi
k
0
∈Π0
E{C}
= argmax
pi
k
0
∈Π0
∑
agq∈A\{ag0}
E{Cq}
= argmax
pi
k
0
∈Π0
∑
agq∈A\{ag0}
((
b
T
q × Z
B
q − r
T
q × Z
R
q
)
×Iq × pi
k
ag
0
,q × e
m
)
(8)
where em is a unit basis vector which represents a mes-
sage distribution where the probability of the message m
is 1 and the probabilities of all other messages are 0s (see
Section 3.4). m is the message that the producer intends to
share as specified in the framework FCA 〈A, C,M,m〉.
Additional trade-offs can be introduced to further tune
the decision making. For example, we can require that there
are no agents in the network that can cause the producer a
negative net-benefit. However, these trade-offs must be in-
troduced carefully so that the resultant optimization prob-
lem can still be solved or approximated efficiently. Regard-
ing computational efficiency, the decision making problem
as described above can involve the search of an exponential
growth joint disclosure policy space of all the neighbors of
the producer if we only allow the producer to employ de-
terministic disclosure policies. If we allow probabilistic dis-
closure policies for the producer, then numerical techniques
(such as gradient ascent and other appropriate numerical op-
timization techniques) can applied to search the joint policy
space more efficiently.
Example 11 Continuing with Example 10, now we can con-
sider all possible messages that BI can deliver to Bob and
Alice. Assume that all BI’s policies are deterministic, and
BI only needs to worry about how to deliver message m1:
France will be invaded by Germany. As there are only two
choices in our example: either the original message m1 or
the message m2 with reduced information, we can, without
loss of generality for this problem constrain the space of all
possible policies for BI on Bob or on Alice to be:
ΠBI,Bob = ΠBI,Alice =
{(
1 1
0 0
)
,
(
0 0
1 1
)}
where the first policy always forward message m1, denoted
by pim1 , while the second policy always forward message
m2, denoted by pim2 . The space of all disclosure policies of
BI is then
ΠBI = ΠBI,Bob ×ΠBI,Alice
which contains 4 elements corresponding to the 4 possible
choices of the message combinations to forward to Bob and
Alice. We list the corresponding expected global net benefits
as follows:
E
pi
m1
BI,Bob
,pi
m1
BI,Alice
{C} = 40.58K
E
pi
m1
BI,Bob
,pi
m2
BI,Alice
{C} = 46.16K
E
pi
m2
BI,Bob
,pi
m1
BI,Alice
{C} = 39.42K
E
pi
m2
BI,Bob
,pi
m2
BI,Alice
{C} = 45K.
As a result,
C∗ = max
pi
k
0
∈Π0
E{C} = 46.16K
pi
∗
0 = argmax
pi
k
0
∈Π0
E{C} = 〈pim1BI,Bob,pi
m2
BI,Alice〉
meaning that sending messagem1 to Bob and sending mes-
sage m2 to Alice is the disclosure policy which achieve the
highest expected global net benefit 46.16K — a best trade-
off criteria on benefits and risks in an average sense.
5 Discussion and Future Work
The work described in this paper makes use of a trust model
implicitly captured via disclosure policies as the core input
to the decision making process. Our probabilistic underpin-
nings are intended to be sufficiently general to enable it to
be instantiated with arbitrary models, such as Jøsang and Is-
mail (2002); Teacy et al (2006). Unlike these models, our
work is not intended to compute a specific trust value based
on some set of interactions, but rather to decide how to use
the trust value output by the models.
The use of trust within a decision making system is now
a prominent research topic; the interested reader is referred
to Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010); Urbano et al (2013) for
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an overview. However, most work in this area assumes that
agents will interact with some most trusted party, as deter-
mined by the trust model. This assumption reflects the basis
of trust models on action and task delegation rather than in-
formation sharing. Burnett et al (2011b) is an exception to
this trend; while still considering tasks, Burnett explicitly
takes into account the fact that dealing with a trusted party
may be more expensive, and thus leads to a lower utility
when a task has relatively low potential harmful effects. Bur-
nett’s model therefore considers both risk and reward when
selecting agents for interaction. However, Burnett situated
his work using utility theory, while the present work allows
for a more complex impact space to be used.
Another body of work relevant to this paper revolves
around information leakage. Work such as Mardziel et al
(2011) considers what information should be revealed to an
agent given that this agent should not be able to make spe-
cific inferences. Unlike our work, Mardziel et al (2011) does
not consider the potential benefits associated with revealing
information.
Finally, there is a broad field of research devoted to as-
sessing risk in different contexts. As summarised in Wang
and Williams (2011), which compares seven definitions of
trust3, the notion of risk is the result of some combination
of uncertainty about some outcome, and a (negative) payoff
for an intelligent agent and his goals. While this definition
is widely accepted (with minor distinctions), different au-
thors have different point of view when it comes to formally
define what is meant by uncertainty. In Kaplan and Gar-
rick (1981), instead of providing a formal definition of risk,
the authors introduce a scenario-based risk analysis method,
considering (i) the scenario, (ii) its likelihood, and (iii) the
consequences of that scenario. They also introduce the no-
tion of uncertainty in the definition of likelihood and of con-
sequences. Doing so allows them to address the core prob-
lem of such models, viz. that complete information of all
possible scenarios is required. The connection between risk
and trust has been the subject of several studies, e.g. Tan
and Thoen (2002) shows a formal model based on epistemic
logic for dealing with trust in electronic commerce where
the risk evaluation is one of the components that contribute
to the overall trust evaluation, Das and Teng (2004) proposes
a conceptual framework showing the strict correspondence
between risk and some definition of trust, Castelfranchi and
Falcone (2010) discusses the connection between risk and
trust in delegation. However, to our knowledge our work is
the first attempt to consider risk assessment in trust-based
decision making about information sharing.
There are several potential avenues for future work. First,
we have assumed that trust acts as an input to our decision
process, and have therefore not considered the interplay be-
3 Although not considered in Wang and Williams (2011), the defini-
tion provided in Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) follows the others.
tween risk and trust. We therefore seek to investigate how
both these quantities evolve over time. To this end, we will
investigate the connections between the our approach and
those based on game theory, such as Goffman (1970). An-
other aspect of work we intend to examine is how the trust
process affects disclosure decisions by intermediate agents
with regards to the information they receive. We note that
agents might not propagate information from an untrusted
source onwards, as they might not believe it. Such work, to-
gether with a more fine grained representation of the agents’
internal beliefs could lead to interesting behaviours such as
agents lying to each other Caminada (2009). Other scenarios
of interest can be easily envisaged, and they will be investi-
gated in future work. For instance, a slightly modified ver-
sion of the framework proposed in this paper can be used for
determining the disclosure policies in order to be reasonably
sure that a desired part of the message will actually reach a
specific agent with which we do not know how to communi-
cate. This is the situation when an organisation tries to reach
an undercover agent by sharing some information with the
enemy, hoping that somehow the relevant pieces of infor-
mation will eventually reach the agent. Our long term goal
is to utilise our approach to identify which message to intro-
duce so as to maximise agent utility, given a knowledge rich
(but potentially incomplete or uncertain) representation of a
multi-agent system.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we described a framework enabling an agent
to determine how much information it should disclose to
others in order to maximise its utility. This framework as-
sumes that any disclosure could be propagated onwards by
the receiving agents, and that certain agents should not be
allowed to infer some information, while it is desirable that
others do make inferences from the propagated information.
We showed that our framework respects certain intuitions
with regards to the disclosure policies used by an agent, and
also identified how an information provider should disclose
information in order to achieve some form of equilibrium
with regards to its benefits and risks. Potential applications
can be envisaged in strategic contexts, where pieces of infor-
mation are shared across several partners which can result in
the achievement of a hidden agenda.
It is clear that from a computational complexity point
of view, using algorithms derived directly from our formal-
ism without optimization, our approach lies inO(M3×N2)
(where M is the upper bound of the size of the message
space, inference space, and impact space andO(M3) comes
from the complexity applying the naive matrix multiplica-
tion algorithm;N is the number of agents andO(N2) comes
from the complexity of computing the equivalent disclosure
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policies using Equation 4 by evaluating all equivalent dis-
closure policy pi0,k for every agent agk through dynamic
programming) in the worst case in evaluating the net benefit
when the disclosure policies are determined. However, we
believe that in real world domains, our matrices will often
be sparse, and that our approach will therefore scale better
in the average case. As for the search over the space of dis-
closure policies for the producer, if we only allows determin-
istic policies, the worst-case complexity will be in O(MN )
(exponential in the number of neighboring agents of the pro-
ducer) using algorithms directly derived from our formal-
ism; when probabilistic disclosure policies are allowed, we
can apply numerical techniques to approximate the solu-
tions. Also if we generalize the fusion operator over arbi-
trary paths (not requiring that the paths have the same start-
ing agent and the same ending agent), and we require that
the fusion operator distributes over the discount operator.
With these constraints in place, we can further derive the
property that the maximization operator of net benefit can
distribute over communication paths. With these additional
requirement, we will be able to search the disclosure pol-
icy space for an optimal net-benefit with complexity linear
in the number of neighboring agents. In this paper we focus
on the fundamental formalisms; we intend, as future work,
to further pursue more efficient algorithms and evaluate our
system on a real world coalition information sharing task in
order to determine both its performance and accuracy. How-
ever, obtaining a sufficiently large data set for this evaluation
is proving challenging.
To our knowledge, this work is the first to take trust and
risk into account when reasoning about information sharing,
and we are pursuing several exciting avenues of future work
in order to make the framework more applicable to a larger
class of situations.
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A The Case of Continuous Random Variables
By utilising Definitions 8 and 9 we can describe the impact of disclos-
ing a message to the consumers on the producer ag
0
.
Proposition 1 Given a FCA 〈A, C,M,m〉; a consumer agq ∈ A;
and the equivalent degree of disclosure x0,q of the producer over agq .
Let yq be the information inferred by agq according to the r.v. Iq(x0,q)
(with probability ≈ fIq (yq;x0,q) dyq). Then, assuming that the im-
pact zq is independent of the degree of disclosure distribution x0,q
given the inferred information yq , ag0 expects an impact zq described
by the r.v. Zq(x0,q) with density:
fZq (zq;x0,q) =
∫
1
0
fZq (zq; yq) fIq (yq;x0,q) dyq.
Proof
FZq (zq;x0,q) = Pr{Zq ≤ zq|x0,q}
=
∫
1
0
Pr{Zq ≤ zq, Iq = yq|x0,q} dyq
=
∫
1
0
Pr{Zq ≤ zq|Iq = yq, x0,q}fIq (yq;x0,q) dyq
=
∫
1
0
FZq (zq; yq) fIq (yq;x0,q) dyq,
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The density function is easily derived from the distribution
FZq (zq;x0,q) since fZq (zq;x0,q) =
d
dzq
FZq (zq;x0,q). ⊓⊔
Moreover, any time we need a single value characterisation of a
distribution, we can exploit the same idea of descriptors of a random
variable, by introducing descriptors for trust and risk.
Definition 13 Let h(·) be a function defined on [0, 1], and y ∈ [0, 1]
be a level of inference. We define
t
Zq
h (x) =
∫
1
0
h(w) fZq (w; y) dw, (9)
to be the y-trust descriptor induced by h(·).
We can do the same to obtain a impact descriptor:
Definition 14 Let h(·) be a function defined on [0, 1], and x ∈ [0, 1]
be a level of disclosure.We define
t
Zq
h (x) =
∫
1
0
h(w) fZq (w;x) dw, (10)
to be the x-impact descriptor induced by h(·).
Typical h(·) include the moment generating functions, such as
h(k) = k, k2, etc., and entropy h(k) = −ln(fK(k)) for the den-
sity of some r.v.K. In the following we use the expectation as the risk
descriptor, leaving consideration of other possible functions for future
work.
Finally, let us illustrate two notable properties of our model. The
first one is with regards to the case where a consumer can derive the
full original message, which, unsurprisingly, leads to the worst case
impact.
Proposition 2 When a consumer is capable of gaining maximum knowl-
edge, then fI(y;x) = δ(y−1), where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function,
and FZ(z;x) = FZ(z) , FZ(z; 1), i.e., the risk coincides with the
1-trust (Definition 9).
Proof By the definition of the inference r.v. I(x), when agx is believed
to gain maximum knowledge then the density fI(y;x) carries all its
weight at the point y = 1 for all x. Hence, fI(y;x) = δ(y−1) and it
follows from the definition of the Dirac delta function, see also Prop. 1
FZ(z;x) =
∫
1
0
FZ(z; y) fI(y;x) dy
=
∫
1
0
FZ(z; y) δ(y − 1) dy = FZ(z; 1). (11)
⊓⊔
The second property pertains to the case where agent ag
0
shares
information with more than one consumer. Such situations are typi-
cally non-homogeneous as the trust and impact levels with regards to
each consumer are different. Clearly, it is beneficial to identify con-
ditions where these impacts balance (and, hence, indicate crossover
thresholds) across the multiple agents.
For two agents ag
1
, ag
2
having corresponding inference and be-
havioural trust distributions FIj (y;x) and FZj (z; y), j ∈ {1, 2}, for
the shared information to have similar impact, x1 and x2 should be
selected, such that the following holds.
FZ1(z;x1) = FZ2(z;x2) ⇔∫
1
0
FZ1(z; y) fI1(y;x1) dy =
∫
1
0
FZ2(z; y) fI2(y;x2) dy.
(12)
Note that the above relationship implies the r.v.s Z1 and Z2 are drawn
from the same distribution. Such a requirement is typically unrealistic.
Therefore in general one may want to consider equalities on the aver-
age, such as, finding x1 and x2 satisfying the following for appropriate
g(·) functions.
E{g(Z1(x1))} = E{g(Z2(x2))}, (13)
Proposition 3 Given that g(z) = z, in order to attain the same level
of impact when ag
0
shares information with ag
1
, ag
2
, the degrees of
disclosure x1 and x2 for ag1, ag2 respectively must satisfy the fol-
lowing.
EI1{E{Z1(x1)|I1}} = EI2{E{Z2(x2)|I2}}. (14)
Proof The case where g(z) = z corresponds to the regular averaging
operator, and (13) becomes:
∫
1
0
∫
1
0
zfZ1(z; y) fI1(y;x1) dy dz
=
∫
1
0
∫
1
0
zfZ2(z; y) fI2(y;x2) dy dz
⇔∫
1
0
fI1(y;x1)
[∫
1
0
zfZ1(z; y) dz
]
dy
=
∫
1
0
fI2(y;x2)
[∫
1
0
zfZ2(z; y) dz
]
dy
⇔
EI1{E{Z1(x1)|I1}}
= EI2{E{Z2(x2)|I2}}.
⊓⊔
